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RAYHOND M. BERRY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
700 Contlnental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
vs. 
UNITED PACIFIC/RELIANCE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
Defendant & Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 15306 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by Aetna Life & Casualty, lia-
bility insurer of Heublein, Inc., to recover damages from 
United Pacific/Reliance, liability insurer of Regina Grape 
Products, to recover amounts incurred by Aetna in settling 
and defending an action against Heublein. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and granted respondent's t1otion for 
Summary Judgment. 
RESULT SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court, including the granting of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 1, 19 7 0, United Pacific/Reliance Insurance 
Company (hereinafter called "United Pacific") issued to 
Regina Grape Products Company (hereinafter called "Regina"! 
comprehensive liability insurance policy No. CLP32221 
effective from July 1, 1970, to July 1, 1973, with a 
limit of $1,000,000 for personal injuries arising from 
each occurrence. On January 1, 1970, Aetna Life & 
Casualty (hereinafter called "Aetna") issued to Heublein, 
Inc., (hereinafter called "Heublein") policy No. 07 
AL138288SR, effective from January 1, 1970, through 
December 31, 1970. This policy insured Heublein against 
loss or injuries in any one occurrence with a limit of 
$1,000,000. 
-2-
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On December 31, 1970, George Shuput, an of=ice 
employee of Parker-Mawood in Salt Lake City, Utah, was 
injured while opening a bottle of pink champagne when 
the cork shot out and struck him in the eye. Thereaf-
ter on June 7, 1973, George Shuput instituted Civil Case 
C-195-73 in the United States District Court of Utah 
against Heublein, Inc., to recover damages for personal 
injury arising from the December 31, 1970, accident. 
The allegations in C-195-73 show Shuput's action is 
against Heublein, a Connecticut corporation, not against 
Regina, which was a California corporation (R6). Nor 
does the Complaint filed in C-195-73 allege that Regina, 
the California corporation that United Pacific insured, 
did anything (R6-9) . 
On December 17, 1970, a plan and agreement of 
merger was entered into between Heublein, a Connecticut 
corporation, and Regina, a California corporation. Arti-
cle I of the merger agreement provides that on the effec-
tive date of the merger Regina shall cease to exist and 
shall be merged into Heublein (R87). Regina in Article 
VI, Paragraph l, subparagraph (e) represented and warran-
ted to Heublein as of October 31, 1970, there were no 
claims or debts or liabilities of Regina, fixed or con-
tingent (R89). Regina also, in Article VI, Paragraph 
-3-
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1(1), warranted and represented that the policies of 
insurance held by Regina would be kept in force until 
the effective date of the merger. 
Article VIII of the conditions of the merger con-
tains no condition requiring Regina to insure Heublein 
against loss from the date of the plan and agreement of 
merger, December 17, 1970, through and including the 
effective date of the merger. At the effective time of 
the merger, the owners of Regina received 60,000 shares 
of Heublein stock in exchange for the delivery of all 
Regina stock owned by the sole shareholder John Ellena 
(Rl02) 
No request was made of United Pacific until 
January 17, 1971, seventeen days after the accident, 
to name Heublein as an additional insured under its 
Policy No. CLP32221. 
The merger became effective January 28, 1971, 
when the Certificate of Merger was filed. 
Section 16-10-71, Utah Code Annotated 1961, 
provides: 
16-10-71. Effect of Merger or Conso~i~a­
tion.--Upon the issuance of the certlfl-
cate of merger or the certificate of con-
solidation by the secretary of state, the 
merger or consolidation shall be effected. 
When such merger or consolidation has 
been effected: 
-4-
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(a) * * * 
(b) * * * 
(c) * * * 
{d) * * * 
(e) Such surviving or new corporation 
shall thenceforth be responsible and liable 
for all the liabilities and obligations 
of each of the corporations so merged or 
consolidated; and any claim existing or action 
or proceeding pending by or against any of 
such corporations may be prosecuted as if 
such merger or consolidation had not taken 
place, or such surviving or new corporation 
may be substituted in its place. Neither the 
right[s] of creditors nor any liens upon the 
property of any such corporation shall be 
impaired by such merger or consolidation. 
[Emphasis added] 
Aetna Coverage 
In Paragraph 6 of the conditions of the Aetna 
policy it is provided: 
6. Other Insurance. The insurance afforded 
by this policy is primary insurance, except 
when stated to apply in excess of or contingent 
upon the absence of other insurance. When this 
insurance is primary, and the insured has other 
insurance which is stated to be applicable 
to the loss on an excess or a contigent basis, 
the amount of the company's liability under this 
policy shall not be reduced by the existence 
of such other insurance. [Emphasis added] 
When both this insurance and other insurance 
apply to the loss on the same basis, whether 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
primary, excess or contingent, the company 
shall not be liable under this policy for a great , 
. ~ proportlon of the loss than that stated in the 
applicable contribution provision below: 
(a) * * * 
(b) * * * Contribution by limits. 
If any of such other insurance does not provide 
contribution by equal shares, the company shall 
not be liable for a greater proportion of such 
loss than the applicable limit of liability 
under this policy for such loss bears to the 
total applicable limit of liability of all valid 
and collectible insurance against such loss. 
United Pacific Coverage 
The following provisions of United Pacific's 
policy are pertinent: 
UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY (A Stock 
Insurance Company, herein called the 
company), in consideration of the payment 
of the premium and subject to all the terms 
of this policy, agrees with the insured 
named in the declarations, hereinafter 
called "named insured," as follows: 
INSURING AGREEMENTS 
I. Liability. To pay on behalf of 
the insured all sums which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay 
by reason of the liability for damages 
(a) imposed upon him by law or (b) 
assumed by him under any contract or 
agreement wholly in writing, because of: 
-6-
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Bodily Injury, 
Property Damage; 
further, to defend any suit against 
the insured in which such damages are 
sought, reserving to the company the 
rlght to lnvestigate, negotiate and 
settle any claim or suit. 
Definitions of interest are as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
As Used in This Policy: 
(a) "bodily injury" means bodily injury, 
sickness or disease sustained by a person, 
including (l) death resulting therefrom 
and (2) damages for care and loss of ser-
vices because of bodily injury, sickness 
or disease. 
* * * 
(c) "occurrence" means an accident, an 
event or a continuous or repeated expo-
sure to conditions causing, during the 
policy period, bodily injury or property 
damage neither expected nor intended by 
the insured. All injury or damage aris-
ing out of exposure due to substantially 
the same general condition shall be con-
sidered as arising out of one occurrence. 
(d) "insured" means the named insured, 
his spouse, if a resident in the same 
household, and: . " 
United Pacific's policy contains the following 
applicable general conditions: 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
(Applicable Only As Otherwise Specified) 
* * * 
-7-
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5. Changes. Notice to any agent or 
knowledge possessed by any person 
shall not affect or waive or change any 
part of this policy or estop the com-
pany from asserting any of its right 
under this policy. The terms of this 
policy shall not be waived or changed, 
except by an endorsement issued to 
form a part of this policy signed by 
the company's authorized representative. 
6. Notice. In the event of an acci-
dent, occurrence or loss, written notice 
containing particulars sufficient to 
identify the insured and also reasona-
bly obtainable information with respect 
to the time, place and circumstances 
thereof, and the names and addresses 
of the injured and of available wit-
nesses, shall be given by or for the 
insured to the company or any of its author-
ized agents as· soon as practicable. 
In the event of theft the insured shall 
also promptly notify the police. If 
claim is made or suit is brought against 
the insured, he shall immediately forward 
to the company every demand, notice, sum-
mons or other process received by him or 
his representative. (Emphasis added] 
* * * 
12. Action Against Company. As a con-
dition precedent to action against the 
company, the insured shall have fully 
complied with all the terms of this 
policy and the amount of his obligation 
shall have been finally determined either 
by judgment after actual trial or by writ-
ten agreement between the insured, the 
claimant and the company. Judgment shall 
not be deemed final until the suit shall 
have been finally determined on any appeal. 
prosecuted therefrom. Any ~erson or organl-
zation or legal representatlve thereof, 
having secured such judgment or written 
-8-
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agreement, shall be entitled to reco-
ver under this policy to the extent 
of the insurance afforded hereby. ~o 
person or organization shall have any 
r1ght under this policy to join the 
company as a party to any action against 
the 1nsured to determine the insured's 
liability, nor shall the company be 
lmpleaded by the insured or by his legal 
representative. Bankruptcy or insolvency 
of the insured or his estate shall not 
relieve the company of any of its obli-
gation. 
In addition to the general conditions, Nos. 4 
and 5 under Conditions read as follows: 
CONDITIONS 
* * * 
4. Assignment. No assignment of inter-
est under this policy shall bind the 
company until its consent is endorsed 
hereon. If, however, the named insured 
shall die, this policy shall cover (a) 
the named insured's legal representa-
tive as named insured, and (b) subject 
to the definition of insured above, any 
person having proper temporary custody 
of an owned or hired automobile, as an 
insured, until the appointment and 
qualification of such legal representa-
tive; provided that notice of cancella-
tion addressed to the insured named in 
the declarations and mailed to the address 
shown in this policy shall be sufficient 
notice to effect cancellation of this 
policy. 
5. Other Insurance. If at the time 
of an occurrence any valid and collec-
tible insurance is available to the 
insured (in this or any other carrier), 
except insurance purchased to apply in 
-9-
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excess of the limit of liabilitv of this 
policy, no insurance shall be afforded 
hereunder as respects such occurrence; 
except, if this policy exceeds the appli-
cable limit of liability of such other 
insurance, this policy shall afford 
excess insurance over such other insur-
ance sufficient to afford the insured a 
combined limit of liability equal to the 
limit of liability of this policy. 
Insurance under this policy shall not be 
construed to be concurrent or contribut-
ing with any other insurance whatsoever. 
[Emphasis added] 
Endorsement 1 of United Pacific's policy shows 
the named insureds at the time of issuance of the 
policy, July 1, 1970. Endorsement No. 19 of the United 
Pacific policy effective January 17, 1971, picks up 
Heublein as an insured. 
In Civil Case C-195-73 filed June 7, 1973, 
Shuput did not name Regina as an insured. Only Heublein 
was named as a defendant. No suit or claim has ever 
been instituted by Shuput against Regina. 
UTAH INSURANCE STATUTES 
Section 31-19-18 provides: 
Contract of Insurance--Variations of terms 
of policy invalid.--No insurer or its agent, 
nor any solicitor or broker shall make any 
contract of insurance or agreement as to 
such contract, other than is plainly 
expressed in the policy issued thereon. 
Any such understanding.or a~reement not 
so expressed shall be lnvalld. 
-10-
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POINT I: United Pacific Did No~ 
Insure Heublein on December 31, 1970. 
It is stipulated between the parties that it 
was not until January 17, 1971, that United Pacific 
was asked to name Heublein as an initial insured under 
its Policy No. CLP32221 (Rl30). 
As a condition to the merger, Heublein in the 
plan and agreement of merger could have required that 
Regina from the date of the plan and agreement of merger, 
December 17, 1970, provide liability insurance for 
Heublein. Heublein did not require that it be named 
an insured from this date on Regina's policy, probably 
because it knew it was afforded coverage by Aetna. The 
requirement in the plan and agreement of merger was for 
Regina to keep in force a policy protecting Regina. 
This was done. The purpose of this requirement was 
because the merger of the corporations does not termi-
nate the liability of Regina. 
In Thomas v. Ogden Rapid Transit Company, 47 U. 
595, 155 Pac. 436 (1960), Thomas, a passenger on the 
Ogden City Transit, brought suit against it for an injury 
arising from a collision. Prior to the trial, Ogden 
City Transit was consolidated into a new corporation 
under the name of Ogden, Logan & Idaho Railroad Company. 
-11-
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The defendant at trial moved for a substitution of 
party defendant, claiming that the consolidation abated 
the action against Ogden Rapid Transit Company. In 
denying the motion, the court said: 
* * * It is urged that by the consoli-
dation all pending actions by or 
against the defendant abated. To sup-
port this, 10 Cyc. p. 310, is cited. 
But on the next page a contrary doc-
trine also is stated. We need not 
consider which of these views is the 
better, for, as we think, the statute 
(Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 340, 341), per-
mitting consolidations of such corpora-
tions, provides that the constituent 
corporations are not relieved from 
their respective debts and liabilities, 
though the consolidated corporation is 
made responsible for the debts and lia-
bilities of both. While it may be con-
ceded that the plaintiff, by proper 
amendments and allegations, might have 
proceeded also against the consolidated 
corporation, or against it alone, yet 
it did not rest with the defendant, 
because of the consolidation, to seek 
a discharge of its liabilities or an 
abatement or dismissal of the action, 
or to compel the plaintiff to proceed 
against the consolidated corporation 
alone. * * * 
Aetna's argument that Heublein is Regina wear-
ing a new dress is not true and is not correct. This 
argument is not logical. At the time the suit was 
instituted by Shuput against Heublein in 1973, Heublein 
was Regina, but Regina, the United Pacific insured, was 
not Heublein. 
-12-
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The purpose in requiring Regina to continue its 
insurance in force was to protect Regina from liability 
until the merger was completed. Merger gives an injured 
person two choices. The injured can either sue the pre-
decessor corporation or the successor. 
If Shuput had sued Regina, United Pacific would 
have been required under the terms of its policy to 
defend Regina. However, as Shuput sued only the suc-
cessor Heublein, and Heublein was not an insured, United 
Pacific owed no duty to defend Heublein and owes no duty 
to indemnify Aetna against the loss for which it had 
been paid a premium to cover. 
If it were true that the action against Regina 
abated upon merger, there would be logic in the argu-
ment that Heublein is Regina, but as this is not true, 
there is no reason why United Pacific should be required 
to indemnify Aetna. 
In some states, claims and even pending claims 
for personal injuries abate upon dissolution of a cor-
poration. Hawley v. Bonanza Queen Mining Company, 61 
wash. 90, 111 Pac. 1073 (1910). This is a carry-over 
rule, probably arising from the idea that personal 
injury claims at common law abated upon the death of 
-13-
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the tort feasor. To escape this hardship, many states 
enacted laws to make the successor corporation liable 
for the liabilities, debts and obligations of a prede-
cessor corporation in the event of merger and dissolu-
tion of the predecessor. Still other states, as 
Connecticut, the domicile of Heublein, and Utah, 
retain the cause of action against the predecessor cor-
poration and also make the successor corporation liable. 
This modern rule, as in Connecticut and Utah, gives the 
injured person the greatest protection. 
Section 33-369(e) of the General Statutes of 
Connecticut is similar to Section l6-l0-7l(e), Utah 
Code Annotated. It reads: 
The Surviving or New corporation shall 
henceforth be responsible and liable 
for all the liabilities, obligations 
and penalties, including liability to 
descending shareholders, of each of 
the merging or consolidating corpora-
tions; and any claim existing or action 
or proceeding, civil or criminal, pend-
ing by or against any such corporatlon 
may be prosecuted as if such merger or 
consolidation had not taken place, or 
such surviving or new corporation may 
be substituted in its place; and any 
judgment rendered against any of ~he 
merging or consolidating corpora~lons 
may be enforced against the survlVlng 
or new corporation. * * * [Emphasis added] 
Under the existing law, Shuput, the plaintiff, 
had an equal right to sue Regina or Heublein. United 
-14-
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Pacific got the premium for insuring Regina. If Regina 
had been sued alone, it would have been the duty of United 
Pacific to defend Regina without assistance from Heublein's 
insurer Aetna. If both Regina and Heublein had been sued, 
Aetna and United Pacific each would have had a duty to 
defend. On the other hand, as only Heublein •..:as sued and 
as only Heublein was an insured of Aetna on December 31, 
1970, it was the entire responsibility of Aetna to defend 
Heublein. 
POINT II: There is No Duty to Defend or Settle When 
Claim Does Not Fall Within Coverage of Policy. 
Plaintiff instituted C-195-73 in the United 
states District Court for the District of Utah against 
Heublein, a Connecticut corporation. There is no alle-
gation in C-195-73 against Regina, the California cor-
poration insured by United Pacific. In fact, there is 
no allegation in the Complaint in C-195-73 that Regina 
designed, manufactured, distributed or did anything. 
Regina, by name, was not mentioned in the Complaint 
in C-195-73. 
The general rule is that if the allegations in 
the complaint against an insured fail to show that a 
claim is within the coverage, there is no duty to defend. 
In McAlear v. St. Paul Insurance Companies, 158 
Mont. 452, 493 P.2d 331 (1972), the Montana Supreme 
-15-
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Court held that where the complaint against an insured 
is clearly not within coverage of professional lia-
bility policy, the insurer would not have been obliged 
to indemnify if complainant recovered and that the 
insurer had no duty to defend action. 
In a later case, Atcheson v. Safeco Insurance 
Company, 165 Mont. 239, 527 P.2d 549 (1974), the 
Montana Court again held that the liability insurer's 
duty to defend is determined by the allegations of the 
complaint filed against the insured. 
In 44 AmJur 2d Insurance § 1539, the general 
rule is stated: 
Upon the basis of the allegations of 
the complaint or petition, the courts 
have adopted the following tests for 
determing whether particular allega-
tions require the insurer to defend 
the action brought against the insured: 
if the complaint in the action brought 
against the insured upon its face 
alleges facts which come within the 
coverage of the liability policy, the 
insurer is obligated to assume the 
defense of the action; but if the 
alleged facts fail to bring the case 
within the policy coverage, the insurer 
is free of such obligation, at least 
initially. Stated differently, the 
insurer is under an obligation to 
defend only if it could be held bound 
to indemnify the insured, assuming 
that the injured person proved the 
allegations of the complaint, regard-
less of the actual outcome of the 
case. * * * 
-16-
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In Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, 12 Ariz. App. 424, 471 P.2d 
309 (1970), the complaint alleged that Vann was using 
the vehicle with the permission of the named insured 
and that this alone created an obligation to defend 
vann even though Vann was not in fact a person to whom 
the insured owed any duty whatsoever under any contrac-
tual undertaking. The policy excluded coverage unless 
vann was a permissive user. The Arizona Cour~ held 
that the policy provision providing that a defense be 
afforded against suits that are groundless, false or 
fraudulent did not under these circumstances require 
the insurance company to defend Vann, a complete stran-
ger to the contract, and that no obligation to defend 
or pay existed and that none could be created by the 
drafter of the complaint. 
In McCarty v. Parks v. Royal Globe Insurance 
companies, 565 P.2d 1122, Utah 1977, this Court held 
that the automobile liability insurer's covenant to 
defend actions against automobile repair shop and its 
owners, as named insureds, ran only to such insureds 
and did not benefit non-permissive users; hence, 
although insurer may have taken some risk in refusing 
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to defend suit against user, who in garnishment pro-
ceedings was found to have been using the vehicle with-
out owner's permission, insurer could not be held lia-
ble for refusing to defend personal injury suit or 
required to pay judgment rendered against user. 
In Civil Case C-195-73 Shuput made no allega-
tions against Regina. No request was made of United 
Pacific to add Heublein as an insured on the Regina 
policy until January 17, 1971, seventeen days after 
the alleged injury to Shuput. 
If there is no duty to defend a non-permissive 
user, there is no duty to defend a company (Heublein) 
that is not an insured and certainly no duty to indem-
nify Aetna the liability insurer of Heublein, Shuput 
could have proven every fact alleged in the Complaint 
in C-195-73 and still would not have been entitled to 
recover from United Pacific through a garnishment pro-
ceeding. 
POINT III: In Any Event, the United Pacific 
Policy Provides Excess Coverage Only. 
United Pacific denies that its policy affords 
any coverage to Heublein. However, for the sake of 
discussion, let's assume that the United Pacific policy 
affords coverage. 
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United Pacific's policy provides that any cover-
age under it is in excess of other insurance coverage. 
United Pacific's "Other Insurance" clause reads 
as follows: 
5. Other Insurance. If at the time 
of an occurrence any valid and collec-
tlble insurance is available to the 
insured (in this or any other carrier), 
except insurance purchased to apply in 
excess of the limit of liabilitv of 
this policy, no insurance shall be 
afforded hereunder as respects such 
occurrence; except, if the applicable 
limit of liability of this policy 
exceeds the applicable limit of lia-
bility of such other insurance, this 
policy shall afford excess insurance 
over such other insurance sufficient 
to aford the insured a combined limit 
of liability equal to the limit of 
liability of this policy. Insurance 
under this policy shall not be con-
strued to be concurrent or contribut-
ing with any other insurance whatsoever. 
[Emphasis added] 
On the other hand, the Aetna policy provides 
that it is primary. In Paragraph 6 of the Conditions 
of the Aetna policy, it is stated: 
6. Other Insurance. The insurance 
afforded by the policy is primary 
insurance, except when stated to 
apply in excess of or contingent 
upon the absence of other insurance. 
When this insurance is primary, and 
the insured has other insurance which 
is stated to be applicable to the 
loss on an excess or contingent basis, 
the amount of the company's liability 
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under this policy shall not be reduced 
by the existence of such other insur-
ance. 
In Russell v. Paulsen, 18 Utah 2d 157, 470 P.2d 
658 (1966), a case before this Court involving unin-
sured motorist coverage, this Court enforced an excess 
other-insurance clause. In Russell the driver's insur-
ance company, United Pacific, settled with the passenger 
for the sum of $4,500.00, and at the time of the settle-
ment, the financial responsibility law required only 
$5,000.00 of uninsured motorist coverage for injuries 
to any one person. Thereafter, recognizing the excess 
clause, the Court found that the plaintiff could not 
recover from her own uninsured motorist carrier, as her 
policy was excess over the primary policy of United 
Pacific, and that as United Pacific's policy had not 
been exhausted, she was barred from recovery. 
The liability of an insurer on a policy with an 
excess clause does not arise until the limits of all 
other valid and collectible insurance are exhausted. 
In Mt. States Mutual Casualty Co. v. American Casualty 
co., 135 Mont. 475, 342 P.2d 748 (1959), an action was 
brought by an automobile liability insurer under a non-
ownership policy providing excess coverage against a 
garage liability insurer to recover amounts paid in 
-20-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
settlement of claims. Mt. States named ~cBee Truck 
Sales as its insured. McBee loaned a truck to Highla~ds 
Golf Club. Peck, an employee of Highlands, while using 
the truck was involved in an accident. Highlands had 
a policy in which the other-insurance clause was excess, 
not pro-rata coverage. Theother-L~surance clause in the 
Mt. States policy was on a pro-rata basis. In finding 
in favor of American and against Mt. States, the 
Montana Court said that the American policy of excess 
coverage was not regarded as other valid and collecti-
ble insurance, as it was not available until the Mt. 
States policy was exhausted. 
Aetna has advocated that the excess clause pre-
vails. In Viani v. Aetna Insurance Co., 95 Idaho 22, 
501 P.2d 706 (1972), the case arose from a gunshot 
wound due to the negligence of Bowles. Bowles and 
Viani had been on a trip together. On returning home, 
Viani tossed from his truck Bowles' bed roll contain-
ing, unknown to Viani, a loaded pistol. The pistol 
discharged, injuring Viani. Bowles had a homeowner's 
policy issued by Aetna with a limit of $50,000 cover-
age and a comprehensive general automobile liability 
policy issued by American with a limit of $100,000 
coverage. Viani had an Allstate Crusader policy on 
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his truck with a limit of $10,000. The jury awarded 
Viani $14,622.00. 
The agent of Bowles gave no notice to American 
of the accident, and no demand was made upon American 
to defend the suit. American was let out of the law-
suit because of failure to comply with notice. However, 
the court found that the Allstate policy, with respect 
to the owned vehicle, provided primary coverage and 
that the Aetna policy, with respect to the non-owned 
vehicle, provided excess coverage. The court found 
that as to the named insured Viani, the vehicle was 
an owned vehicle and that as to Aetna it was a non-
owned vehicle and that as Bowles was not the owner, 
the Allstate policy was primary and the Aetna policy 
was excess. 
In Insurance Law & Practice, 8 Appleman 4914, 
Appleman states the rule: 
* * * In such case, the liability of 
the excess insurer does not arise until 
the limits of the collectible insurance 
under the primary policy have been 
exceeded. It should be noted that 
under thisrule, the courts give no 
application to the other ~nsuran~e 
clause in the primary pol1cy, wh1ch 
provides that if the additi?nal insured 
has other valid and collect1ble lnsur-
ance,he shall not be covered by the 
primary policy. That is because the . 
insurance under the excess coverage pol1cy 
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is not regarded as other collectible 
Lnsurance, as it is not available to 
the Lnsured until the ?ri~ary insur-
ance polLcy has been exhausted. * * * 
In this case, in defending Aetna has recognized 
that its policy affords valid and collectible insurance. 
Its limit was $1,000,000, and in making the settlement 
with Shuput for Heublein the limit was not exhausted. 
Globe Indemnity Company and Roval IndemnLtv 
Company v. Western Casualty & Surety Comoanv, 523 P.2d 
858, Utah 1974, is another Utah case upholding an excess, 
other-insurance clause. In Globe Indemnitv, Iverson, 
the owner of a Chevrolet pickup truck, took it to 
Gordon Wilson for repairs and borrowed a passenger 
automobile to use while repairs were being undertaken. 
Iverson gave permission to his daughter to use the 
loaned vehicle, and she in turn allowed her boyfriend 
Carl Lundeberg to drive the vehicle, and an accident 
occurred while Carl Lundeberg was driving the loaned 
vehicle home from a show. Western Casualty had a policy 
that afforded coverage on the residence of the Lundeberg 
household. Globe Indemnity had a policy in effect 
covering Iverson, and Royal Indemnity had a garage 
liability policy in effect covering Gordon Wilson 
Chevrolet Company. Western undertook the defense of 
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the action and settled. Globe and Royal initiated pro-
ceedings to have it determined who should indemnify 
against the loss. Royal's policy provided that its 
policy shall be excess insurance over any other valid 
and collectible insurance. The Globe policy also pro-
vided that it was excess and that coverage would be 
afforded if there was no other valid and collectible 
insurance. This Court, following Russell, held the 
primary liability for indemnity was on Western. 
Consistency is important. This Court should 
follow the general rule, including its decisions in 
Russell and Globe Indemnity, and hold no coverage is 
afforded under the United Pacific policy to Heublein 
because the primary limit of the Aetna policy was not 
exhausted in the settlement with Shuput. 
POINT IV: As Heublein Has Not Incurred a Loss, 
United Pacific Is Not Obligated to Indemnify Heublein. 
Heublein incurred no costs and expenses arising 
from the Shuput claim. Aetna, not Heublein, paid the 
loss and settled the claim of Shuput. 
Even assuming, which United Pacific denies, that 
its policy insures Heublein, Heublein has no loss, and 
2\etna can take nothing by way of an assignment of 
Heublein's interest. 
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In New Hampshire Insurance Company v. Ballard 
Nade, Inc., etc., 17 Utah 2d 86, 404 P.2d 674 (1965), 
a similar problem was presented to this court. In New 
Hampshire, supra, the fire insurer of the lessor brought 
an action for indemnity seeking to recover the amount it 
paid under a fire insurance policy. No return or offset 
of a premium was given to the lessee by New Hampshire. 
This Court held that New Hampshire was not entitled to 
recover from the lessee, stating that the lessee pro-
mised only to pay any loss to the lessor and that as 
the lessor lost nothing after insuring himself, the 
assignee of the lessor New Hampshire could not recover. 
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Holt, 28 
Utah 2d 426, 503 P.2d 1205, this Court held where an 
uninsured motorist had never been sued and no judgment 
had been rendered against the uninsured motorist for 
damages, there was no legal obligation on the part of 
the uninsured to pay any money and that the trial court 
was without authority to enter judgment against an unin-
sured motorist's insurance company. 
The assignment of interest clause in United 
Pacific's policy provides that no assignment of interest 
under its policy shall bind the company until its consent 
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is endorsed on the policy. United Pacific was not 
requested to add Heublein as · d 
an lnsure until January 
17, 1971. Section 31-19-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
As Amended, provides: 
Contract of insurance--Variations of 
terms of policy invalid.--No insurer 
or its agent, nor any solicitor or 
broker shall make any contract of insur-
ance or agreement as to such contract, 
other than is plainly expressed in the 
policy issued thereon. Any such under-
standing or agreement not so expressed 
shall be invalid. 
There is not one word in the United Pacific 
policy that expresses any intent whatsoever to insure 
Heublein prior to January 17, 1971. 
The general rule is that a liability policy is 
a personal contract and cannot be assigned. This is 
true where assignment is expressly prohibited by the 
terms of the policy unless the insurer consents. 
Rendelman v. Levitt, 24 S.lv.2d 211, Mo. App. 1930; 
Ocean Accident & Guaranty Company v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Company, 100 F.2d 441, 8th Cir. 1939. This 
rule is based on the right of the insurer to chose its 
insured so as to know what risk it is undertaking. This 
rule is based on the reasoning that the liability of one 
person for the same injury may be substantially greater 
in dollars than the liability of another. 
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Everyone knows that the liability of a national 
company will lead to a substantially greater amount 
being awarded in damages than the liability of a local 
company or individual. 
While it is true that insureds can assign rights 
to recover losses under property coverages, it is not 
true that an individual or company can buy a liability 
policy in its name and then require the insurance com-
pany to defend some other company or individual. 
CONCLUSION 
.The judgment of the lower court should be 
reversed and summary judgment granted in favor of 
United Pacific and against Aetna because: 
1. United Pacific did not insure Heublein on 
December 31, 1970, the date Shuput was injured. 
2. United Pacific's obligation was to defend 
Regina, which could have been sued and was not. 
3. The allegations in the Complaint in the 
case instituted by Shuput against Heublein in United 
States District Court for the District of Utah show 
no duty on the part of United Pacific to defend Heublein 
or to settle claims against Heublein. 
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4. As the primary coverage of ~etna was not 
exhausted, no coverage is afforded under the United 
Pacific policy, even if it be construed that both 
United Pacific and Aetna are insurers of Heublein. 
5. As Heublein incurred no loss and paid no 
expenses arising from the Shuput action, Heublein has 
lost nothing, and its assignee Aetna has no hook upon 
which liability can attach. 
6. The no-assignment-of-interest clause bars 
DATED this /?d(day of ~ , 
recovery rights of Heublein and ~ I 
1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & !V'.ARTINE.n.U 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies 
of this Brief were mailed to Carman E. Kipp, Attorney 
at Law, 600 Corrunercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, by United States Mail, postage prepaid,.on 
the ~ day of 1'1-t_j} , 1977. 
';Jff:!_sA a 
-28-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
